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Abstract 
One of the major developments in the consumer technology market in recent years has 
been the explosion in the use of smartphones. The versatile devices have become very 
popular, with a whole host of functions being conducted on the platform, from social 
networking to e-commerce and internet banking. As the value of the transactions being 
conducted on these platforms increases, their attractiveness to cyber criminals has also 
increased. Amongst the smartphone platforms, the Android operating system looks 
poised to become one of the most popular platforms. Unique in its open source nature, 
this thesis examines the security concerns with the use of VoIP applications, a popular 
class of applications on this platform. Current literature on the security of smartphones, 
in particular the Android operating system, is examined. This is followed by testing an 
Android smartphone to determine the ease with which it can be compromised. Detailed 
analysis of the testing helps to highlight the areas of vulnerability, and what both users 
and manufacturers should do in order to ward off the threat from attackers. The 
examination helps to identify the particular vulnerabilities of the Android operating 
system on smartphones, as well as the threats that can materialise with the use of VoIP 
applications. The research also develops a set of recommendations for both the users 
and manufacturers, and identifies further areas of research in this rapidly developing 
area. 
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1.  Introduction 
1.1 Research Background, Aims and Objectives 
 
The last few years have witnessed an explosive growth in the use of smartphones. 
These phones have significant computing power and can be considered to be mobile 
computing devices. They are able to support a large number of applications and 
provide users with enhanced functionality. However, the increased variety and value of 
the transactions conducted on these phones have made them  lucrative targets for 
cyber criminals. Therefore, it has become important and necessary to examine the 
security of these devices. 
The aim of the current research is to evaluate the security of VoIP services on the 
Android mobile phone platform. The research question can be framed as: How secure 
are VoIP services on smart phones? 
The research objectives are: 
To examine the range of security vulnerabilities of the Android platform on smart 
phones 
 To examine the threats to smart phone security 
 To evaluate the threat posed to users  
 To evaluate the effectiveness of current security measures 
 To evaluate the overall security of smart phones, especially on the 
Android platform 
The chart in Chapter 2 shows the growth of the global smartphone market. Side by side 
with this growth in the use of smartphones is the growth of usage of Android phones, 
one of the most popular mobile operating systems. This growth of the use of Android 
phones makes them a very attractive target for attackers who wish to target relatively 
affluent people with smartphone. The Android operating system is open source 
software, and it is relatively easy to develop a wide range application on the platform, 
which is another reason to it. The wide use of these applications presents a 
vulnerability to the users. VoIP applications are a class of applications that are popular 
 
 
 
2 
because they help the user to reduce the cost of calls. In these applications typically 
the data is routed over the Internet using the mobile Internet rather than the mobile 
telecommunications network. The significant reduction in cost combined with recent 
notable improvements in VoIP technology suggest that VoIP is coming of age. More 
and more VoIP applications are being introduced for the Android and other related 
smartphone platforms. Users are attracted to the ease of use of these applications as 
well as the significantly reduced costs for making international calls (Maisto 2010). 
Combined with the explosion in the use of Android based smartphones, it is suggested 
that VoIP applications can become a major target for attacks. Hence research into this 
highly attractive target for attacks is both necessary and timely.  
1.2 Thesis Organisation 
The entire work is divided into five chapters. This first chapter has attempted to present 
a picture of the current situation in the market. It has shown how the growth of the 
smartphones market is being driven by the growth of adoption of Android phones, and 
explained the importance of VoIP applications on the platform. It has also identified the 
research aims and objectives. The next chapter, Chapter two, will examine current 
literature in the subject area. Chapter three will discuss the research methods and 
methodologies, identifying the test cases that would be used in the current research. 
Chapter four will present the results of the research and discuss the implications of the 
research findings. Chapter five concludes the research, presenting the overall research 
conclusions and identifying further areas for research. 
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 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Growth in the Use of Smartphones 
In the last two to three years there has been an explosion in the growth of use of 
smartphones around the world and particularly in the UK. Arthur ( Arthur 2011) reports 
that just under half of the population in the UK now own a smartphone, and 
furthermore, the sales of smartphones continues to grow very rapidly. The IDC 
expected that the worldwide smartphone market will grow by almost 50% in 2011 
(Essany 2011). Amongst smartphones, Android is becoming one of, if not the most 
common operating system. This operating system developed by Google now powers 
half of all smartphones sold in the UK. Android is followed by RIM’s Blackberry with 
22.5% of the market and Apple’s iPhone at 18.5%. A large number of smartphones 
today use the Android operating system. Amongst them are the HTC Desire HD, Sony 
Ericsson Xperia Ray, HTC Sensation, Samsung Galaxy SII, etc. The phenomenal 
growth in the use of Android phones is shown in Fig. 2.1 below. 
 
Figure 2.1. Growth in the use of the Android smartphones in the UK (Source: Arthur, 
2011a) 
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In fact, comScore (2012) suggests that Android-based phones are the second most 
popular phones in the  EU, next only to Symbian phones (Nokia), which is in fact 
experiencing a decline. Table 2.1. below shows the most popular smartphone platforms 
used in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK (EU5). From this table it can be seen 
that Google’s Android is the fastest growing smartphone platform across EU5. 
 
 
Table 2.1  Top Smartphone Platforms in EU by Share of Phone Users (Source: 
comScore, 2011) 
 
Top Smartphone Platforms in EU5 by Share of Smartphone Users* 
3 Month Average Ending July 2011 vs. July 2010 
Total EU5 (DE, FR, IT, ES and UK) Mobile Subscribers, Age 13+ 
 
 
 
Share (%) of EU5 Smartphone 
Users 
Jul-10 Jul-11 Point 
Change 
    
Total Smartphone Users 100.00% 100.0% 0.0 
Symbian 53.9% 37.8% -16.1 
Google 6.0% 22.3% 16.2 
Apple 19.0% 20.3% 1.2 
RIM 8.0% 9.4% 1.5 
Microsoft 11.5% 6.7% -4.8 
 
 
 
In fact, such is the growth of the Android platform that comScore (ibid) suggest that the 
growth of smartphones is actually driven by the growth of adoption of Android 
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phones.One of the key features of the Android operating system is that it is an open 
source system. This means that the source code of the operating system is available to 
anyone. This availability makes it easier for developers to create new applications. In 
fact, it is suggested that Android phones have become popular because unlike many 
other phones, they are relatively easy to manipulate. This makes it easy for developers 
to develop a large number of applications and users to install a wide variety of 
applications (Android Phones UK 2012). 
 
2.2 The Android Operating System 
The Android operating system is essentially a free open source operating systems for 
mobile phones. This operating system therefore allows for the creation of mobile 
applications. Meier (Meier 2010) explains that the Android system also comes with a 
number of peripherals such as: 
i. A hardware reference design that describes the capabilities required for a 
mobile device to support the software stack 
ii. A Linux operating system that is optimised for mobile devices and allows for 
low level interface with the hardware 
iii. A host of open source libraries for application development 
iv. A run time used to execute and host Android applications, including the 
Dalvik virtual machine 
v. An application and user interface framework 
vi. Core applications 
vii. A software development kit 
The application execution environment is sandboxed, and the only way the applications 
can interact with the phone is through the application programming interfaces (APIs). 
The applications are written in Java and run in the Dalvik virtual machine.   
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2.3 Security Analysis of the Platform 
Shabtai et al. (Shabtai 2009) assess the various security aspects of the Android 
framework and identify a number of security vulnerabilities. Firstly, they explain that the 
platform is susceptible to all the problems associated with the Linux kernel. The Linux 
kernel itself is not a completely secure piece of software, as evidenced by the number 
of CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) entries logged. Within the kernel, the 
drivers and vendor specific additions are more vulnerable, because these run with the 
highest privileges. Shabtai et al. suggest that in order to minimise vulnerable code 
being submitted, there needs to be more robust checks on the code submitted to the 
kernel.  
In terms of the Android platform, Google has added some extensions to the kernel in 
order to extend existing functionality. This has also added to the vulnerability of the 
platform. Commercial literature has covered the particular areas of vulnerabilities of the 
Android operating system in detail. For example, Diaconescu (Diaconescu 2012) points 
out that on the Android operating system, zero permission does not actually mean zero 
permission. He explains that when a zero permission application was created in order 
to determine the data that would be available for harvesting in such an application, it 
was found that the application was able to access the data in the privileged SD card 
access area. Unless the operating system protected each and every file, the 
application would be able to open the folder. Secondly, it was also found that the zero 
permission application was also able to determine the different applications that were 
installed on the device at the time of testing. The problem that arose was that the 
application would be able to determine the exact applications installed on the device, 
and in turn use the applications with weak permission vulnerabilities to harvest data or 
perform other malicious functions. Finally, he reports that any application can access 
key information about the device itself, such as the GSM and SIM vendor IDs. This 
information that is collected without permission can also be sent anywhere even if the 
application does not have Internet permissions. Diaconescu (ibid) also points out that it 
is widely accepted that Google Play, the market for Android applications is also a major 
source of viruses. 
In addition to the vulnerabilities inherent in the Android platform, the modifications 
made by manufacturers of other phones can also introduce vulnerabilities to the 
operating system, as highlighted by  Mello (Mello 2011). He highlights a case to point in 
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the HTC Android phones which have a  major flaw in that they allow any application 
that has Internet access to also have access to a significant amount of sensitive 
information such as email addresses, GPS locations, phone numbers, system logs 
(which track what the individual applications do, including logging into secure locations) 
and text message data. This flaw was traced to the modifications made to the Android 
operating system by HTC, the phone manufacturer itself.  
 
2.4 General Threats to Mobile Devices  
 
Mobile devices are characteristically devices that are portable, personal and can be 
carried with ease from a place to another. The growth of interconnectivity of array of 
mobile devices as well as continuous mobile threats has made mobile device usability 
more challenging. Mobile devices such as Notebooks, smartphones, Tablets, Media 
Players and other portable devices are often deployed as integral components of 
mechanical, electronic and electrical systems. Connectivity to the Internet by these 
devices can either be wired or wireless (Muttik 2011). Many mobile platforms have their 
proprietary resource communities where guidelines about hardware, operating system 
updates and processes, and external resources such as applications can be accessed. 
 
Threats are communicated intents to inflict harm or loss to a person, and then Mobile 
Threats are all communicated attempts to inflict harm or loss to a Mobile Ecosystem 
through mobile devices or physical means (Mitchell 2012). Cyber-crimes aimed at 
mobile devices usually do occur for different reasons ranging from hardware theft, 
information theft to denial of service. There are many facets to mobile device attacks 
which make it difficult to draw a line between criminality and terrorism.  It is important to 
know that Mobile threats exist because there are some forms of human and system 
inefficiencies in design and decision making process. It is also important to know that 
Cyber-crime against Mobile devices cannot be completely eradicated but it can be 
greatly reduced after a while with concerted efforts and dissemination of proper 
knowledge about the tricks of the infiltrators. Sometimes the cost of production and 
prospects to have more applications on the Appstore make Mobile platform Vendors 
compromise security requirements. 
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2.5 Classifications of Mobile Threats  
 
Mitchel (Mitche, l2012) generally classifies Mobile Threats into two broad categories 
but the author of this thesis added another category: Physical threats. This thesis 
hereby presents the general classifications of Mobile Threats: Communication-based, 
System-based and Physical means. All forms of Mobile Threats can be definitely 
classified into one of these threats families. Communication-based threats are network-
oriented and include access network impersonation, mobile device impersonation, 
Man-in-the-middle attacks e.t.c, System-based attacks  exploit the inefficiencies of the 
Operating system core and include all software vulnerabilities, side channel and social 
engineering attacks (including malicious applications) while physical attacks are 
hardware theft. 
2.5.1 Man-in-the-browser  
 
This kind of mobile crime is committed when malicious software steal or modify 
financial information from a browser during an online banking session. Sometimes 
these Trojans can completely hide malicious transactions from the user. On major 
mobile platforms, this mobile threat  becomes  impossible unless the Operating system 
itself is compromised and the malware runs as root. 
 
2.5.2 Loss and Theft  
 
The form factors in which various mobile devices are designed makes it easy target for 
theft. Also, the tendency of losing or misplacing these devices is very high as a result of 
the small sizes in which they come. In view of this, a lost or stolen mobile device can 
be compromised if it does not have adequate security measures activated, thereby 
sensitive  data can be accessed or exposed to the public. Apart from unwanted data 
access, a mobile device owner can incure huge financial loss if unauthorized phone 
calls are made from a compromised device by unauthorized persons. 
2.5.3 Disposal  
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There are risks inherently present when mobile devices are not properly disposed. The 
disposed device may continue to hold sensitive information and this information may 
end up in the wrong hands which may lead to serious security breach or privacy 
invasion. Resetting a device manually does not guarantee a total erasure of information 
on the phone. This act may physically remove the intended information but logically the 
erased information may still be present until it is overwritten by a new data. These 
days, there are software and hardware products that can be used to recover erased 
data from mobile devices in the market and this could be used otherwise if found in the 
possession of a Cyber Crime criminal. 
 
2.5.4 Spam  
 
Unsubscribed materials can be received by mobile devices users because of the 
operating system vulnerabilities and weak access network and security policies or 
protocols which make mobile devices share certain personal data (ITSEAG 2009). In 
addition to the annoyance of receiving undesirable and unsolicited materials, 
unsuspecting users can erroneously accept unintended charges on their 
communication services as a result of spam messages. In addition, spam messages 
are sometimes used as a tool for carrying out denial-of- service attack and introduction 
of malware targeted at mobile devices. 
 
2.5.5 Network Connectivity  
 
The majority of threats to mobile devices come from connectivity. Common threats like 
Man-in-the-middle attacks: stealing of data from an application interface or form due to 
neglect of software security measure during implementation, interception of backup 
data over a network, and persistent connection of pair-wise technologies such as 
Bluetooth and Infrared are perpetrated through the connectivity of mobile devices, even 
those exploited on the vulnerability of software still largely rely on the network 
connection for its optimal goal.  
 
2.5.6 Multiple Identities  
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Many so called mobile devices that are supposed to be personal are not really personal 
as they are being shared by family members, friends and colleagues. This sharing 
feature increases the vulnerability of such mobile devices to theft and important 
information.  
 
2.5.7 Software Vulnerability  
 
Software vulnerability arise from lapses that are system based and such vulnerabilities 
may be found first with the core of the OS of the Mobile platform or with the user 
application because of the bridge in specified security requirements.  
Some Mobile threats are exploited on the OS vulnerability. Designers of a Mobile OS 
might not have envisaged some certain security threats as at the time of release, which 
might make the platform very vulnerable. Mobile Threats thrive on the lapses in the OS 
architectural design which makes the Mobile device easily maneuverable. It is like a 
multiplier effect; once the OS core is corrupt, every application on the mobile device is 
made to act in tandem with the malicious software. The stability of a Mobile Ecosystem 
determines how well secured a mobile device is and the system security should not be 
compromised. 
 
Mobile device vendors also tend to allow some quick and dirty solutions to be deployed 
which are usually inadequate. They do this because of the pressing needs to have a 
large base of applications to the users’ taste. System Security and application base are 
trade-offs, which a Mobile platform vendor must strive to strike a balance in order to 
keep reputation, marketplace and satisfy its user community. Some applications on the 
Application store are easily attackable and carry some malware which can populate 
themselves on the resident mobile device, other connected device(s) and the 
Application store (Marketplace). 
2.6 Security Management  
 
Security management is usually a tedious exercise and costly if threats are allowed 
uncensored. The possible pain and losses incurred from Mobile threats might be 
unimaginable, so one needs to explore all possible measures to stop the Cyber 
criminals. Here are some tips for securing a user application in order to make it less 
vulnerable.  
11 
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1. Eliminating unnecessary functionality (reducing the attack surface) can solve many 
problems  
2. Following good software engineering practices can minimize the risk of buffer 
overflow vulnerabilities.  
3. Use of robust crypto and sound security protocols that are widely available and 
standardized would safeguard the application.  
 
In conclusion, the fight against Mobile threats must be collective. End users of Mobile 
devices must be security conscious and should suggest possible ways of tracking 
cyber criminals, because users seem to be more conversant with some of the tricks. 
The system designers and application developers must also uphold specified security 
requirements and keep thinking like cyber criminals too, because only someone with a 
criminal mind for good purpose can checkmate the actual cyber criminals. 
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3  Research Methods and Methodology 
3.1 Research Methods and Strategies 
The research effort will examine secondary data from multiple sources and collate the 
results. These results will be analysed and the result will be given by a combination of 
induction and deduction. The Android platform is used as a case study for in depth 
study.  
3.2 Test Cases 
All the test cases were carried out in Google’s Nexus S android smartphone with latest 
Android 4.0.4 (Ice cream sandwich)-based operating system.  
For most comprehensive security testing Logging Test App version 13 will be used. 
Logging Test App was first developed when Trevor Eckhart, an IT enthusiastic came to 
know about Carrier IQ and the amount of information it collects. Carrier IQ is a 
California-based company which is supposed to provide diagnostic analysis to wireless 
industry from the data collected through smartphones. Carrier IQ was accused of 
collecting personal data from smartphones for example,  logging SMS, key strokes and 
location data. So in the beginning Logging Test App was used to check whether a 
smartphone has been logged by Carrier IQ or not. Later on the developer expanded 
the functionality of the application to make it a powerful security testing application. 
Logging Test App version 13 can be downloaded from the XDA Developers forum, 
after downloading it into the smartphone using the default browser; users have to 
enable “Unknown Sources” under security settings to install the application. After 
successfully installing the application, it should be given root (Super User) rights to gain 
access to all the logs file. 
13 
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Figure 3.2.1. Installation and Preview of Logging Test App version 13 
 
Logging Test App consists of 4 main tools among which only two of them are required 
for this test. “Installed Package Tools” to scan loggers, adwares and hidden processes  
and “Internet Security & Network Tools” for scanning cookies and other data which are 
sent from the device to the Internet.  
For further research and details ADB (Android Debugging Bridge) was used. It is a 
comprehensive tool to manage and debug android device via PC. ADB comes with 
Android Software Development Kit package. After downloading the Android Software 
15 
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Development Kit and installing it in the PC, ADB can be found under “platform-tools” 
folder which is inside  the “android-sdk” folder. While installing the Android SDK, it also 
installs the entire required driver for a device to be controlled via ADB. 
 
Test Case 1: Malware No. 1 (Android CounterClank 
Trojanhorse) 
For Test Case 1, Android CounterClank Trojanhorse was installed on the Android 
phone. Since all affected application has been removed from Google Play Store, the 
affected application (in our case  Balloon Game,  from com.christmasgame.balloon) 
was installed manually. After downloading it and copying the file from the  PC to 
device’s memory, the application was installed.  
   
Figure 3.2.2. Installation of Balloon Game infected with ClounterClank  
 
The application’s permission was carefully observed and has been listed below: 
 Storage: modify/delete USB Storage 
The application can read and write on USB storages and SD cards. 
 Network communication: full internet access, view network state 
 The application can  create  network connection and check network status. 
 Phone calls: read phone state and identity 
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 They can be used to  detect whether device is being used for calling or not, access to 
the information like phone number and device id. 
 System tools: prevent phone from sleeping, install shortcuts, read Home 
settings and shortcuts, uninstall shortcuts 
They can prevent the device from being idle (sleep), install or uninstall shortcuts in 
home screen and The application can read home screen settings. 
The application was also observed under Logging Test App for further details. Being 
one of the widespread malware for android smartphones, detailed information about 
this malware was easily available, including information on how this application exploits 
notifications feature and home screen shortcut for advertisement purposes. All the key 
aspects about this malware were noted as posted in the Internet and similar tests were 
done using ADB. 
 
Test Case 2: Malware Application 2 
(AndroidOS/Foncy) 
All the known Trojans are removed from the Google Play Store; therefore they should 
be installed in the device manually, similarly to the process of Test Case 1. This time 
also the AndroidOS/Foncy, an SMS Trojan, application was downloaded to a PC and 
copied to memory of the phone. After that, it was installed. The affected application that 
was used during this test is called Madden NFL 12 (Fake SuiConFo, com.android.bot). 
The differences between the malware in first test case and this malware will be 
observed. 
17 
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Figure 3.2.3. Installation of Fake Madden NFL 12 infected with AndroidOS/Foncy  
 
These are the permissions required for this application: 
 Network communication: full internet access, Google Play license check, view 
network state, view Wi-Fi state 
It can create of network connection, check network and wifi status and also create new 
Bluetooth connection. Also users can check if they have purchased the application 
from Google Play store or not. 
 Personal information: read sensitive log data 
It can read different system logs which have general usage information of the device 
including personal and private data. 
 Storage: modify/delete USB storage contents 
It can read and write on USB storages and SD cards. 
 Hardware controls: changer audio settings, control vibrator 
It can change the vibrations, volume levels and other general audio settings. 
 Phone calls: read phone state and identity 
It can detect whether the device is being used for calling or not, access to the 
information like phone number and device id. 
 System tools: change network connectivity, change Wi-Fi state, prevent phone 
from sleeping 
They can connect to different wifi access point and change the configuration, change 
the network connectivity and prevent the device from being idle (sleep). 
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The application was also  scanned via Logging Test App for other information. After 
that ADB was used to test the presence of any other malware files. As mentioned in 
several blogs and security research using ADB (adb shell), the following locations were 
checked: 
 /data/data/com.android.bot/files/footer01.png 
 /data/data/com.android.bot/files/header01.png 
 /data/data/com.android.bot/files/border01.png  
A test was done deleting these files to see whether the malware will create them again 
or not. 
 
19 
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Test Case 3: Genuine Application 1 (Fring) 
Fring is one of the highly used applications for communication between different 
platforms of smartphones. As from the description on Google Play Store, it is called 
“The Ultimate Video Chat App”. It allows users to have group video chat with other 
smartphone users around the world in real-time. One can install Fring very easily in the 
Google Play Market. 
 
   
 
  
Figure 3.2.4. Installation of Fring 
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The list of the permissions of Fring from the android play store is mentioned below: 
• Services that cost users money: send SMS messages, directly call phone 
numbers 
They can call and send SMS to different phone numbers without a user interaction and 
confirmation. 
• Hardware controls: change audio settings, record audio, take pictures and 
videos, control vibrator 
They can change the vibrations, volume levels and other general audio settings, 
access to recorded audio files, take and collect images through camera without any 
user knowing it. 
• Your messages: read SMS or MMS, receive SMS  
Apart from sending SMS automatically, it can read all the old and new SMS stored in 
your device. 
• Network communication: full Internet access, create Bluetooth connections, 
view network state, view Wi-Fi state  
It can create of network connection, check network and wifi status and also create new 
Bluetooth connection. 
• Your personal information: read contact data, read sensitive log data 
It can read all the contacts and address information stored in the device. Also, the 
application can read different system logs which have general usage information 
including lots of personal and private data. 
• Phone calls: read phone state and identity 
They can detect whether device is being used for calling or not, access to the 
information like phone number and device id. 
• Storage: modify/delete USB storage contents modify/delete SD card 
contents 
It can read and write on USB storages and SD cards. 
• System tools: change Wi-Fi state, prevent tablet from sleeping prevent 
phone from sleeping, disable keylock, retrieve running apps, modify global 
system settings, automatically start at boot 
They can connect to different wifi access point and change the configuration, prevent 
the device from being idle (both sleep and keylock), access information about all the 
other running application in the system, access and modify the system settings and 
also start automatically when the device is booted.Fring was scanned with Logging 
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Test App and then also its privacy policy was also taken consideration for further 
research. 
  
Test Case 4: Genuine Application 2 (Tango) 
 “Tango” is also another communication application similar to Fring. It can be installed 
from Google Play store like Fring. All the test cases were conducted with similar 
communication applications to make the report fairer. Description from the store says 
that Tango is only application that lets a user send free video messages, video calls 
and phone calls. Since Tango is available in multiple platforms, it is one of the highly 
used communication applications. Currently Tango is operating in nearly 190 countries 
with tens of millions of users, security concerns in this kind of applications is very 
important. 
 
.    
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Figure: 3.2.5 Installation and preview of Tango 
 
Here is the list of permissions that Tango allows 
 Your accounts: manage the accounts list, act as an account authenticator, 
discover known accounts 
This can manage and modify accounts, use account authenticator of 
“AccountManager” to create accounts, get and set the password. 
 Hardware controls: record audio, take pictures and videos, change your audio 
settings, control vibrator 
They can change the vibrations, volume levels and other general audio settings, 
access to recorded audio files, take and collect images through camera without any 
user knowing it. 
 Your messages: receive SMS 
It can retrieve the messages and use them. 
 Network communication: full Internet access, create Bluetooth connections, 
view Wi-Fi state, view network state, receive data from Internet 
It can create of network connection, receive data from the application server, check 
network and wifi status and also create new Bluetooth connection. 
 Your personal information: read sensitive log data, read contact data, write 
contact data 
It can read and modify all the contacts and address information stored in your device. 
Also, the application can read different system logs which have general usage 
information including lots of personal and private data. 
 Phone calls: intercept outgoing calls, read phone state and identity 
They can detect whether device is being used for calling or not, access to the 
information like phone number and device id. They also can modify the dialled number 
for outgoing call and manipulate them. 
 Storage: modify/delete USB storage contents modify/delete SD card contents 
It can read and write on USB storages and SD cards. 
 System tools: prevent tablet from sleeping prevent phone from sleeping, disable 
keylock, change Wi-Fi state, change network connectivity, write sync settings, 
automatically start at boot, read sync settings 
They can prevent the device from being idle (both sleep and keylock), read the sync 
setting of the device and also start automatically when the device is booted. 
 Default: Market billing service 
23 
 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES, BACHELOR’S THESIS | Gboyega James Akinbami 
  
It can let the users make app purchase within this application. 
Tango was scanned with Logging Test App and also similar to Fring, its privacy policy 
was also taken into consideration. There was no past research inti its security issue. 
Test Case 5: Genuine Application 3 (Viber) 
Alike the two previous test cases, “Viber” is also another communication tool for 
smartphones. It is also available in multiple platforms and offers services like text 
messages and free calls to other Viber users globally. Viber have stated that currently 
there are nearly 40 million Viber users around the word. It is being used more than both 
of our test cases around the world across different platforms.  
  
Figure 3.2.6. Installation and preview of Viber 
The permissions that Viber needs are:  
 Your accounts: act as an account authenticator, manage the accounts list, 
discover known accounts 
This can manage and modify accounts, use account authenticator of 
“AccountManager” to create accounts, get and set the password. 
 Services that cost  money: directly call phone numbers, sending SMS 
messages 
They can call and send SMSto different phone numbers without a user interaction and 
confirmation. 
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 Hardware controls: change audio settings, record audio, take pictures and 
videos, control vibrator 
They can change the vibrations, volume levels and other general audio settings, 
access to recorded audio files, take and collect images through camera without any 
user knowing it. 
 Your location: fine (GPS) location, coarse (network-based) location 
It can access the exact or coarse location of the user either using GPS or connection. 
 Your messages: receive SMS 
They can retrieve the messages and use them. 
 Network communication: full Internet access, create Bluetooth connections, 
receive data from Internet, view network state 
It can create of network connection, receive data from the application server, check 
network status and also create new Bluetooth connection. 
 Your personal information: read contact data, write contact data, read sensitive 
log data 
 
It can read and modify all the contacts and address information stored in the device. 
Also the application can read different system logs which have general usage 
information including lots of personal and private data. 
 
 Phone calls: read phone state and identity, modify phone state 
They can detect whether device is being used for calling or not, access to the 
information like phone number and device id. It also can modify the dialled number for 
outgoing call and manipulate them. Also,  they can modify phone networks without user 
noticing. 
 Storage: modify/delete USB storage contents modify/delete SD card contents 
It can read and write on USB storages and SD cards. 
 System tools: prevent tablet from sleeping prevent phone from sleeping, 
Bluetooth administration, disable keylock, change network connectivity, modify 
global system settings, retrieve running apps, write sync settings, kill 
background processes, set wallpaper, read sync settings, read sync statistics, 
send sticky broadcast 
They can prevent the device from being idle (both sleep and keylock), read and modify 
the sync settings of the device, administrate the Bluetooth of the device, change 
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network state, access information about all the other running application in the system , 
kill background processes, set system’s wallpaper and send sticky broadcasts.  
Default: directly call any phone numbers, disable or modify status bar, power tablet on 
or off power phone on or off 
 
 
It can call any numbers (including emergency) without user knowing it, automatically 
turn on and off the device, add or remove system icons and also can disable the status 
bar. 
 
This application was also scanned via Logging Test Application; also its privacy policy 
was researched carefully for any security loop hole. 
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 4  Findings and Discussion 
 
4.1 Results  
The findings from the secondary data are presented with a discussion of the 
implications of the findings. It is expected that the research will be able to present a 
snapshot of the state of security of smart phones, particularly on the Android platform. 
The findings from the case study are subsequently  generalised and compared with 
other platforms in order to arrive at the overall research findings.  
 
Before any other applications were installed, Logging Test App showed few 
logs and loggers which already exist in the device. 
 /data/anr/:  A directory where all the Application Not Responding data with 
details about it are saved. 
 /data/tombstones/: A directory used to save system dump when an app 
crashes in Linux system. 
 /data/system/throttle/:  A directory that has files about the logs of 3G 
usage created by services.jar 
 /data/system/dropbox/: A directory for the log of all the session details 
from when the phone started to when it ended. 
 /data/system/usagestats/: A folder containing logs of application usage 
 Market Feedback Agent: Known logging agent, Android application 
store’s feedback agent. 
As mentioned above, in a normal device there is presence of all application 
crash logs and statistics, application usage statistics and other general session 
information which are vulnerable to attacks. This information can be accessed 
with a normal application with specific permissions which could lead to serious 
security issues. 
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Test case 1:  
 
Android CounterClank Trojanhorse appeared to be more of an adware than 
malware itself. However, it compromises the device id and saves the user 
information like IP address in remote server. Basically, it can be called as 
aggressive adware because it installs third party “Mobclix” adware logger for 
advertising and pushes advertisement in thenotification bar and installs different 
advertisement shortcuts in home screen. By reading some security blogs,  it 
was known that this malware also sends user IMEI (International Mobile 
Equipment Identity) information to its server for identifying the unique user. 
Because of constant “push notification”, making numerous shortcuts in home 
screen and also making different bookmarks of advertisements in browser, 
some consider this as malware while others just an aggressive adware. 
   
Figure 4.1.1. Homescreen Ads Shortcuts and Push Notification Ads because of 
Androind CounterClank 
 
All the functions that this application did were listed under the permission list. It 
was clearly stated that it will read device id and number, will install home screen 
shortcuts and also have permission to read home screen settings. But since it 
was using them aggressively and annoying the user with lots of advertisements, 
it can be considered as aggressive adware acting as malware. 
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Test case 2: 
 
AndroidOS/Foncy did not show anything on Logging Test App but it was 
running in the background as the name com.android.bot. It appeared to be 
copying three executable files in main system.  
 /data/data/com.android.bot/files/footer01.png 
 /data/data/com.android.bot/files/header01.png 
 /data/data/com.android.bot/files/border01.png  
 
Figure: 4.1.2 Executable files created by AndroidOS/Foncy 
 
Among these three files, two of them (footer01 and header01) could enable a 
remote user to gain root access, send personal information to remote servers, 
compromise the device and run different commands on it, while the third 
one(border01) was responsible for sending SMS to different international 
numbers. 
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Figure 4.1.3. Executable files recreated automatically by AndroidOS/Foncy when 
deleted 
 
The test fake application had the same name as the real genuine application 
(which costs), which led many users to download the application and get their 
devicesinfected. The entire permission list included and shown while installing 
the application was just a clone of real application, it did not have anything to do 
with the malware itself. The malware was just gaining the access to the device 
with a security hole and using those three files mentioned above to cause all 
the attacks. 
 
            Test Case 3  
 
Fring is a verified application and is easily available from Google Play market. 
Among its entire permissions list, almost all of these permission are an issue of 
privacy and security for users. As we can see from the permissions list, Fring 
can read  the device identity, contact details, read sensitive log data, read and 
sendSMS, directly call phone numbers. Also from Fring’s privacy policy it has 
been stated that Fring does not share personal data like contact details but 
since they are using third party for advertising, it is stated that Fring might save 
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cookies, web beacons and similar technologies for better advertisement. Since 
Fring uses Google’s third party advertisement system, Logging Test App 
showed it on the list of Google Adwares. One noticeable detailö while opening 
Fring for first time was that it asked a permission to read contacts. Its privacy 
policy was also detailed in mentioning that Fring do not sell any personal 
information to any third party. 
 
Another noticeable detail was that Fring is a genuine application but taking 
reference to its   permission lists if it was not then verified as genuine 
application below are some of the risks to a user, it may: 
 
 Cost a user money by sending messages without the user’s confirmation.  
 Monitor a user’ messages or delete them without showing them to the 
user. 
 Cause unexpected calls on the user’sphone bill.  
 Read your confidential messages.  
 Use internet connection to send the user’s data to other people. 
 Use personal or private information. 
 Discover private information about other apps. 
 Corrupt  system configuration. 
 
 
            Test Case 4: 
 
Tango asked for permission to read the contacts as Fring did. But what was 
different in Tango was that it synced the contacts between the server and the 
device. Also, in its privacy policy,  Tango failed to mention about not selling or 
renting or providing those information to any third parties alike Fring’s privacy 
policy where it was specified, which indirectly might mean that in some cases 
Tango may sell those information. Since Tango does not have any third party 
ads services neither does it do some suspicious logging so it did not appear 
anywhere in Logging Test App, but Tango have stated themselves that Tango 
will collect data like calls, numbers of calls made by members, call durations, 
usage by geographies, device and connection information, IP address, device 
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capability, bandwidth, statistics on page views, network type from the device for 
better performance. 
 
Similarly to Fring, we will have to consider the risk of Tango too, if it was not a 
verified application and taking consideration the permissions lists, it may: 
 
 Cost  the user money by sending messages without the 
use’sconfirmation.  
 Monitor user messages or delete them without showing them to the user. 
 Cause unexpected calls on the user’s phone bill.  
 Read  confidential messages.  
 Use internet connection to send theuser’s data to other people. 
 Cause excess data usage. 
 Use personal or private information. 
 Use this to erase or modify the user’s contact data. 
 Discover private information about other apps. 
 Corrupt  system configuration. 
 
 
Test Case 5: 
 
After installing Viber, the functionality was much similar to Tango and Fring 
combined, but in a sense that it  also synced contacts with server and device  
similarly to Tango. Viber’s privacy policy stated that it will nott sell or rent or 
share any personal information stored in Viber servers. However, Viber have 
mentioned that they will record the IP addresses of the users for different 
demographics. One notable statement in case of Viber is about call detail 
record which means Viber records call time, call quality, destination and number 
of calls for quality assurance. For all of those activities the permission was 
granted from the users, that is why it also did not appear in Logging Test App. 
 
Some of the risks that users have to consider having Viber in the system and 
giving all the permission required by Viber, it may:  
 Cost the user money by sending messages without the 
user’sconfirmation.  
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 Monitor user messages or delete them without showing them to the user. 
 Cause unexpected calls on the user’s phone bill, also to emergency 
services. 
 Use this to determine where the userise, and may consume additional 
battery power 
 Cause excess data usage. 
 Use internet connection to send user data to other people. 
 Use personal or private information. 
 Use this to erase or modify user contact data. 
 Discover private information about other apps. 
 Corrupt  system configuration. 
4.2 Discussion 
It is clear that all applications have some risks in them but the difference is 
whether the application is genuine or not. Being a genuine application, it always 
gives users a chance to complain to someone or for someone to look into in the 
case of attacks. In case of application infected with different malwares a  user 
will not even notice anything, not even the theft of their personal and private 
data.  
 
Between two malware: Android CounterClank which is not muchof a threat to 
users, and AndroidOS/Foncy which poses a significant threat in every possible 
way, it gives access to remote users to access the device, it compromises all 
the personal data. It also sends different SMS around the world to different 
numbers creating costs to user without asking for the permission of the user. 
 
In the case of the genuine application test cases, the conditions were much 
different. The application data, and clarifications regarding what permissions 
are required and their significances are definite and well specified. By going 
through the privacy policy of respective application it was also clear what they 
will do with the  store private information like personal call log, call recordings, 
text messages, contact addresses and other device settings.  
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 5  Conclusions 
5.1 Conclusions 
The use of smartphones is expanding at a phenomenal rate. The Android 
platform is one of the most popular platforms for the new breed of smart 
phones. This makes it a prime target for developments in the area of smart 
phone security. The current research is important because it will help identify 
the potential and most likely areas of vulnerability, assess the current and likely 
future level of threats against smart phones, and give users guidance on the 
issue. It will also help to raise awareness as to the areas which industry efforts 
have to be concentrated on in order to improve the security of the platform. 
 
By this research it is confirmed that no matter what there is always threat to 
users’ personal data if either the device is full of infected application or full of 
genuine application. The only difference is that if the personal data is 
compromised because of malwares, then it is the user who is to be blamed, 
otherwise it is those application development firms which were storing the data. 
In this technologically advanced world once the data is out, there is nothing one 
can do to erase it forever and user’s private information will be public.  
 
We are assured by the research that the malware infestation can cause a lot of 
data usage, calls and SMS messages to different unknown phone numbers 
which results in huge phone bills which cannot be a least of concern. Losing 
money and private information at the same time is an important issue for a 
general user. At this growth rate of smartphone usage and at the same time 
numbers of malware in the market, it is certain that nobody is secure enough. 
Users do not have that much of a choice, they have to use smartphone and its 
applications, and with the increment of infected application and new malwarem 
there is no company that can actually prove and satisfy their customer in this 
sector. 
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Although we can see a lot of mobile antivirus in the market, they can only disinfect a  
device from the infection that has been detected already but  not the one that is being 
developed. Since android applications are really easy to build and it does not take that 
much time for a developer to build an application that can violate some security hole 
that is discovered. Until the infection is massive and is clearly researched by a security 
expert, no one sees an antivirus that can disinfect the infection.  
 
In the end it all depends on user what to save in their beloved smartphone and study 
what application are they installing in their system. Also a user cannot assure the 
security of an applications’ server, so it depends on the user whether to believe what a 
website says or not. It is better to know for sure what one is doing before complaining 
about it to other institutions. 
 
5.2 Further Areas for Research 
This research is a really a very minuscule part of whole security research on 
smartphones as it only consisted android smartphone and very few test applications. 
To obtain a clear idea about security issues on android, research needs to be 
conducted on large scale with different and huge amount of application in different 
version of androids, as they have different security issue within them. Using old 
antiviruses and using new malwares, testing them will give a whole new perspective 
Apart from that we can carry out similar tests in different platform not just only android. 
There are other platforms like Apple’s iPhone, Symbian, Windows Phone 7 and 
Blackberry’s RIM which have significant market shares. Only after all this research  has 
been carried out, can one get a gist about how vulnerable users are in this 
technological world and what are the measures they can take to prevent themselves for 
these kinds of infection and data leakage. 
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